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INTRODUCTION
The administrative justice landscape is potentiallyvery wide, and there is so much happening, orabout to happen, in this area at the moment. This,
along with many developments in the work of my own
office at present, means that I have been faced with some
difficult choices of what to include in and omit from this
article. I have decided to try to achieve three objectives:
1. To enhance your knowledge of who Ombudsmen are,
what they do and what, in particular, they bring to the
landscape of administrative justice.
2. To share with you some recent cases I have been
involved in, where Ombudsmen, and the courts – and
in some cases Parliament as well – have all been (and in
some respects still are) wrestling with the same issues,
and sometimes indeed the same subject matter. In
doing so, I want to share some thoughts about how the
current administrative justice framework and
administrative justice machinery might be better
designed to deal with that interface between
Ombudsmen and the courts, in everyone’s interests,
but especially in the interests of our customers.
3. Finally, I would like to look at the broader
constitutional picture, and to reflect on the interface
with other forms of scrutiny, and in particular with
Parliament.
A CHANGING LANDSCAPE
This is a fascinating time in the development of
administrative justice and public law. The Administrative
Justice White Paper: Transforming public services: Complaints,
Redress and Tribunals, published by the Department for
Constitutional Affairs in July 2004, has set a wide agenda.
The planned new Administrative Justice Council, evolving
from the Council on Tribunals, will keep under review the
whole administrative justice landscape, from first instance
decision making to the courts, tribunals, ADR and, of
course, Ombudsmen.
In 2004 autumn the Law Commission held a seminar on
Monetary Remedies in Public Law, involving participants
from legal practice, academia, government, ombudsmen
and the judiciary. As a result the Commission decided to
include in its ninth programme of work a scoping study to
look more broadly at remedies against public authorities.
In doing so they said that they had;
“…moved beyond thinking about the specific question of
monetary remedies to the broad range of remedies that
currently exist, including those available to courts, tribunals
and ombudsmen, to explore the extent to which changes
might be contemplated which could result in a more
integrated and straightforward system of resolving disputes
involving public authorities.”
In 2005 the National Audit Office published a report on
Citizens’ Redress. Change and reform are certainly in the
air.
WHAT THE CITIZEN WANTS
A good place to start when looking at the administrative
justice landscape is with the citizen. What is it that the
citizen and service user wants from public authorities?
How does that equate with administrative justice?
It seems to me that people want the state at all levels,
central and local, to:
• make correct decisions;
• act lawfully;
• administer public organisations well and effectively;
• provide services to a good standard.
When public service providers don’t do that, people
want an administrative justice system that:
• puts things right as speedily as possible;
• provides appropriate redress/remedies, specific and
general;
• does so at reasonable and proportionate cost; and,
most importantly,
• extracts the learning from the experience and feeds it
back to public service providers to improve decision
making and standards of service.
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When I spoke about these issues at the Council on
Tribunals conference in Autumn 2004, I called that
“appropriate and proportionate dispute resolution”, or put
another way, “horses for courses”. All of us who deliver
“administrative justice” have our strengths and weaknesses,
whether we work through adversarial systems (courts &
tribunals), inquisitorial systems (ombudsmen), or systems
of dispute resolution (eg mediation, conciliation or
arbitration). What is important, and therefore where our
common interests should lie, is that the system of
administrative justice, and administrative justice
machinery, should operate in a manner that enables any
individual dispute in the administrative justice sphere to
get to the place (ombudsman, court, tribunal, mediator,
regulator) where it has the best chance of being effectively
resolved as quickly as possible. In that way our customers
get the best outcome because we all do what we’re good at
– and what we’re best placed to deliver.
THE BENEFITS OF OMBUDSMEN
So what are Ombudsmen good at? What are we best
placed to deliver, and what is our special contribution to
the administrative justice landscape?
The report of the recent Law Commission seminar
summarised that very well:
“Ombudsmen offer distinct advantages. They are free,
confidential and accessible and perceived by the public as
independent. They offer a range of remedies including
financial redress, which may take the form of payments of
money owed or compensation for quantifiable losses, losses of
a non-monetary kind, “botheration” and lost opportunities.
… Although determinations made by an ombudsman are not
binding, this did not present a problem in the vast majority of
cases. Ombudsman schemes also seek to promote good
administration by considering the standards to be expected of
public authorities and framing their decision-making
accordingly, as well as providing feedback and advice to ensure
that errors are not repeated.”
The range of remedies available through ombudsmen
includes:
• apology;
• specific action (do the repair, transfer a tenant, plant a
tree, name a bench in memory of a loved one);
• financial redress – monetary loss, (eg backdate the
benefit – with interest, loss of value, loss of
opportunity, distress, inconvenience).
However, there is more that Ombudsmen offer after
remedies have been applied:
• We follow through, ensuring compliance with
recommendations;
• We ensure that others in a similar position are also
compensated;
• We make general recommendations for reviews of
practice, policy or procedures;
• We issue good practice guidance, eg the Local
Government Ombudsman’s reports on neighbour
nuisance and school admissions and appeals;
• As PHSO I can make special reports to Parliament on
issues of systemic maladministration, (eg NHS funding
for continuing care, tax credits). These reports are
especially appropriate where large-scale or persistent
problems are revealed by complaints.
The positive view expressed at the Law Commission
event is shared at the highest levels of the legal system. In
2003, the Court of Appeal considered the approach to be
adopted by the courts when considering claims for
damages under the Human Rights Act 1998. The court
went on to say that complainants should generally turn to
Ombudsmen, rather than the courts, “at least in the first
instance” where they are claiming damages for a breach of
human rights caused by maladministration.
Recently I have also noticed a heartening and growing
awareness among the judiciary and the legal world more
generally of the advantages we offer. As the Council on
Tribunals (of which I am an ex officio member as
Parliamentary Ombudsman) continues to develop its role
in administrative justice, it is building a constructive and
productive relationship with the British and Irish
Ombudsman Association and collaborating on some
projects of mutual interest – such as mapping the
landscape of administrative justice and the regulatory
environment – and developing principles of good
complaint handling.
The Ombudsman’s inquisitorial process is now being
seen by many as more effective and economical than the
traditional court or tribunal adversarial model for arriving
at the resolution of certain disputes. Unlike the courts,
ombudsmen on the whole do not need hearings. We do not
need parties to be represented by lawyers, and we are
effective at getting the evidence we need. In many cases
ombudsmen are the best and most pragmatic way of
resolving the problem.
CURRENT CASES
Let me turn to some very recent cases in which I have
been involved where the courts have also had a role to play
– sometimes before, sometimes after, sometimes during
the involvement of the Ombudsmen – and invite you to
reflect on whether these systems, processes, and remedies
worked as well as they might have done in the interests of
those on the receiving end of actions of public authorities.
Balchin
In Autumn 2005 I published a report on the case of Mr
and Mrs Balchin, which revolved around the actions of the
Department for Transport and Norfolk County Council. As 19
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such, the complaint was in both my jurisdiction and that of
the Local Government Ombudsman and we each
undertook an investigation. Working in close collaboration,
we found maladministration both by the Council and the
Department and concluded that each must carry an equal
share of the responsibility for the hardship caused to the
complainants. We recommended that each body should
pay £100,000 to Mr and Mrs Balchin. Both the Council
and the Department accepted our recommendations.
However, the legislative framework meant that
collaboration with my Local Government Ombudsman
colleague was not as easy as it should have been. The
relevant legislation requires that the Local Government
Ombudsman and I publish separate reports. While both
reports can be read individually, it is only when they are
read together that the full story can be understood. For this
reason each report has the other annexed to it.
This experience illustrated the need for reform of the
legislation covering aspects of the working arrangements of
public sector Ombudsmen, something which we have been
seeking for some time. The current restrictions on our
ability to work together mean that we cannot easily provide
the sort of joined-up service that we should be able to give
all citizens who have complaints which cross more than
one Ombudsman jurisdiction.
Change, I am pleased to say, is finally on its way, in the
form of a Regulatory Reform Order on which the Cabinet
Office has recently consulted, which will allow the Local
Government Ombudsmen and the Parliamentary and
Health Service Ombudsmen to carry out joint
investigations much more easily. This clearing of the
undergrowth in one part of the administrative justice
landscape will, I believe, be a source of real benefit to the
citizen.
But Mr and Mrs Balchin’s story goes back a long way –
and has also involved the courts. Their complaint related to
a series of decisions by the local authority not to purchase
their home in the 1987, 1990 and 1992. My report was the
fourth by a Parliamentary Ombudsman. Mr and Mrs
Balchin first complained to the Parliamentary Ombudsman
in early 1994. My predecessor but one issued the first
report on the case in December 1994. He did not find
maladministration by the Department of Transport.
That first report – and two subsequent reports in 1997
and 2000 – were quashed following judicial review
proceedings in the High Court brought by Mr Balchin. In
his judgment in 1994 Mr Justice Sedley, as he then was,
commented on the local authority’s decision which he
described as “highly questionable” and “a textbook
example of a fettered discretion” by a local authority.
Would it not have been better all round if at that point in
the consideration of the case there had existed a
mechanism for the High Court Judge to pass the case
directly to the Local Government Ombudsman – who was
much better placed to deliver a remedy to Mr and Mrs
Balchin than the High Court would ever be – and ask him
to have a look at it?
Far Eastern civilian internees – “A debt of Honour”
The next case involves both the courts and the
Parliamentary Ombudsman – but in this instance they have
been looking at different aspects of the same events.
On July 12, 2005, I laid before Parliament a special
report entitled A Debt of Honour, my report of the
investigation I had conducted into complaints about the
administration of the ex gratia scheme for British civilians
interned by the Japanese during the Second World War.
The complaints I had received and investigated related to a
decision to introduce a new eligibility criterion – that to
qualify for payment under the scheme, a claimant had to
have been born in the UK or have had a parent or
grandparent born here – many months into the operation
of the scheme.
I found that the actions of the Ministry of Defence had
constituted maladministration in four respects: in the
overly quick manner in which the scheme had been
devised; in the lack of clarity in the announcement of the
scheme; in the failure to ensure that the introduction of the
new criterion did not have an adverse impact in terms of
equal treatment; and in the failure to inform claimants that
the eligibility criteria had been changed. I recommended
that the Ministry of Defence review the operation of the
scheme and reconsider the position of those who had been
adversely affected by the maladministration. I also
recommended that an apology be made to those refused
payment and that that regret should be expressed tangibly.
But interestingly, this is another case where the courts
have also been involved. First, a judicial review brought by
the Association of British Civilian Internees Eastern
Region challenged the legality of the Government’s
decision to introduce a bloodlink criterion as a
requirement for eligibility for certain claimants. ABCIFER
contended that the decision was disproportionate and/or
irrational, involved a breach of legitimate expectation
and/or was conspicuously unfair and an abuse of power.
The action failed, first in the High Court and in the Court
of Appeal in 2003. Second, in a more recent High Court
judgment in June 2005 in a judicial review case brought by
an internee (now in her 80s), and supported by the
Commission for Racial Equality against the Secretary of
State for Defence, the scheme was found to be unlawful in
that it directly discriminated against people of non-British
national origin.
It was also found that the Secretary of State was in
breach of his duties under section 71 of the Race Relations
Act, that is “to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination and
to promote equality of opportunity and good relations
between persons of different racial groups.” I will say no
more about that case which I understand is the subject of
appeals by both parties, and a cross appeal.20
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The judicial review on the racial discrimination point
was a different complaint and did not affect my
investigation. But the existence of the judicial review on
the lawfulness of the scheme exercised us considerably in
identifying what space was left for us properly to
investigate a complaint – albeit from someone
unconnected with the organisation that brought the
judicial review – of what we described in the report on the
case and in the special report to Parliament as
“maladministration short of unlawfulness”. I will not go
into the detail of that here, but for Ombudsmen scholars I
would refer you to paragraphs 11–39 and 129–34 of my
report, which deal with these issues in detail, and
specifically paragraph 131 which says:
“Questions of legality are for the courts to decide and I do not
seek to question or comment on their findings. Questions of
maladministration are for me to decide.”
It did occur to us that we might have been able to
conduct a more comprehensive investigation if the judicial
review had never been brought. The Court of Appeal
judgment clearly sympathised with the appellants.
“Naturally, we feel very great sympathy for all those who
suffered appalling ill-treatment at the hands of the Japanese
during their captivity. We also well understand that many
civilians had their hopes of receiving compensation raised by
[the Minister’s] announcement of November 7, 2000, and
that they have been extremely disappointed, and indeed
angered, by what they see as a subsequent and unfair change
of heart on the part of the Government. But anyone who seeks
to challenge as unlawful the content of a non-statutory ex-
gratia compensation scheme faces an uphill struggle. We do
not think that the introduction of this scheme was well
handled by the Government. But for the reasons that we have
given, the appellant has failed to satisfy us that the scheme
was unlawful.”
Would it not have been better if the judges had decided
the case would be better dealt with by the Parliamentary
Ombudsman and handed it over?
Tax credits
The final area of our casework I want to refer to is the
topical subject of tax credits. Over the past two years, a
high proportion of the cases referred to me as
Parliamentary Ombudsman has concerned Working and
Child Tax Credits. In June 2005, I therefore presented a
special report to Parliament, Tax credits: putting things right.
My report’s recommendations covered the way
overpayments are handled, communication with
customers, the steps that should be taken to reduce the risk
of financial hardship, the provision of easier and quicker
customer access to staff who could address problems and
queries, and effecting prompt and efficient complaint
handling. I also recommended that consideration should
be given to writing off all excess and overpayments caused
by official error during 2003–05.
The Paymaster General has responded to my report,
promising improvements to the administration of the
system and to the quality of information to claimants, but
not accepting all my recommendations. I, of course,
welcome the Government’s assurances that they are taking
action to improve the administration of the tax credits
system. I have also had useful and constructive discussions
with the Revenue about the future handling of complaints
and I am hopeful that we will see a reduction in cases in
due course, although that time might be some way off.
One of the issues discussed in that report is the question
of automatic recovery of overpayments of tax credits. It has
been suggested by others, not by me, that automatic
recovery is unlawful because it is a fettering of discretion.
I have said that whether or not it is unlawful (and I couldn’t
possibly comment on that), it is certainly maladministrative
because it is unfair and a fettering of discretion. It is
possibly another example of “maladministration short of
unlawfulness” – unless of course the courts decide that no
reasonable Ombudsman could ever reach that conclusion?
A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE?
That leads me to some interesting questions about the
constitutional issues in all of this. The Parliamentary Public
Administration Select Committee have, as they should,
taken a strong interest in some of these recent cases. The
success of the Parliamentary Ombudsman system depends
on there being a clear understanding by all involved – and
particularly the bodies complained against – of the
Ombudsman’s constitutional position and role in dealing
with complaints. There, the story is distinctly mixed.
In the case of the Far East civilian internees, the
Ministry of Defence did not accept all of my findings and
has only agreed to implement the latter two
recommendations. This decision by the Government is of
considerable regret to me. The position of the Revenue on
the recommendations in the tax credits report is still not
entirely clear. When the Chairman of the Revenue
appeared to suggest in response to a question from a
member of the Treasury Select Committee Sub Committee
that he was challenging the Ombudsman’s finding of
maladministration, he was challenged pretty firmly back by
a member of the Committee who said “Isn’t the Ombudsman
the arbiter of maladministration?”
But if Government makes a habit of challenging the
Ombudsman’s conclusions on what constitutes
maladministration, where does that get resolved? In
Parliament? In the courts? Occasionally maybe, but not as
a matter of routine, and preferably not at all.
Does not the Ombudsman concept – in the public
sector at least – depend on an acceptance by all concerned
that unless she takes leave of her senses and reaches
conclusions that no reasonable ombudsman could ever
reach, the Ombudsman is indeed the “arbiter of
maladministration.” It is after all her trade, and most High 21
Amicus Curiae Issue 63 January/February 2006
A
rticle
A
rticle
Court judges only look at an ombudsman case once or
twice in a lifetime.
My predecessors and I have not needed or sought
enforcement powers because the system has worked pretty
well for nearly 40 years. However, if departments get used
to disputing my findings, I believe that the landscape of
administrative justice will change radically, and not to the
advantage of the user of public services. I am certainly not
claiming that there is a constitutional battle about to break
out over the role of the Parliamentary Ombudsman, but it
always is possible, with the best will in the world, for
simple misunderstandings to lead to more serious
problems. We must not let this challenge turn into a crisis.
The place of Parliament
I am reassured by the fact that I am not alone in facing
this challenge. I am very fortunate in that, when my office
was established in the 1960s, Parliament decided to put in
place a number of mechanisms to support, and scrutinise,
the work of the ombudsman – a select committee and the
requirement for complainants to ask their MP to refer
complaints (the latter is incidentally not the case with my
other role as Health Service Ombudsman for England). I
have sometimes felt frustrated when explaining the
complexity of my title and the extra syllables that the word
Parliamentary brings with it. The “MP filter” hardly makes
for easy and rapid access to the services of my Office.
However, recent events have clearly revealed the value of
the Ombudsman’s link with the legislature. In many
respects, good relations with Parliament are just as
important for ombudsmen as our relations with the courts.
It is Parliament that holds ministers to account on policy,
implementation and service delivery, and there are a
number of ways in which it can support me.
Conversely, the work of ombudsmen, with its focus on
individuals and the impact of policy implementation, can
complement and strengthen the scrutiny carried out by
committees in both Houses. For example, the Public
Administration Select Committee is taking a continuing
interest in the Debt of Honour report, and a further
session on tax credits is likely. In this sense, we can see not
just an administrative justice landscape, but a broader
space shared with the executive and with the legislature.
A better map needed
My optimism about the growing understanding of our
role in some parts of the judiciary and Parliament does not
mean that I am satisfied with the present state of the
administrative justice landscape. The July 2004 White
Paper envisages a major role for the new Administrative
Justice Council which would mean that it would be
responsible for, as well as continuing statutory supervision
of tribunals, “taking full account of the broader landscape
of administrative justice”. In detail this would include the
responsibility to:
• keep under review the performance of the
administrative justice system as a whole drawing
attention to matters of particular importance or
concern;
• review the relationships between the various
components of the system (in particular ombudsmen,
tribunals and the courts) to ensure that these are clear,
complementary and flexible;
• identify priorities for, and encourage the conduct of,
research; and
• provide advice and make recommendations to
government on changes to legislation, practice and
procedure which will improve the workings of the
administrative justice system.
The underlying principle of all this is that the system
needs to be made more readily navigable for the user. That
implies that cases can be transferred easily and quickly
between parts of the system, for instance from courts to
ombudsmen, or from tribunals to ombudsmen. It should
be established at an early stage what is the most
appropriate and proportionate way of resolving a dispute
or complaint. The legislation does not make that easy at the
moment; I think the Administrative Justice Council will
have its work cut out, but it is vital that it succeeds.
One problem is that “administrative justice” as a
concept is not easily defined. Many tribunals are concerned
with relations between citizen and state, clearly working to
ensure that there is a level playing field between the might
of the state in its various forms and the interest of the
individual citizen and service user. But other tribunals are
concerned with disputes between citizens, and some are
mixed. Similarly, ombudsmen come in all shapes and sizes,
and many in the representative body of ombudsmen, the
British and Irish Ombudsman Association, are concerned
with the private sector.
Some ombudsmen offices are well established and
clearly form part of the administrative justice landscape:
the UK Parliamentary Ombudsman and the English Local
Government Ombudsmen, and the Scottish and Welsh
Public Services Ombudsmen and the Northern Ireland
Ombudsmen. There are also a number of specialist
ombudsmen who deal with complaints about the prison
service and about social (and some private) landlords.
Yet in education and in other important areas of the
public service there are few ombudsmen schemes or none
at all. There are private sector ombudsmen for financial
services and the telecommunications industry and the
removals industry and for surveyors, but not for the
utilities or the retail sector generally. This is an unco-
ordinated system in itself, and its links to the civil justice
system and where relevant to other parts of the
administrative justice system are not at all clear.22
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Devolution has enabled ombudsmen dealing with
devolved and local government matters in Scotland, Wales
and Northern Ireland to combine their functions in ways
which make a great deal of sense. Yet I am still responsible
for non-devolved matters and the main features of the
landscape are still not easy to summarise.
The British and Irish Ombudsman Association would
have liked the White Paper to have proposed an obligation
on the Council to:
“keep all [ombudsman] schemes under review with the aim of
ensuring that there is both clarity and choice for users wishing
to pursue their grievance or dispute. We also consider that
there may be benefits for users if the Council were to verify
applications for use of the title ‘Ombudsman’ using published
criteria of independence and quality, such as the British and
Irish Ombudsman’s Association’s criteria for recognition of
Ombudsman schemes.’
That did not prove possible for the DCA, but the
principle of preserving the integrity of the concept of an
ombudsman is an important one at a time when more and
more ombudsmen bodies are being created.
It seems to me that all of us – ombudsmen, tribunals,
courts, other ADR providers – are part of the same
administrative justice landscape. We provide a variety of
means to an end, not a series of successive and increasingly
higher hurdles for our customers to clear, and whereas we
might provide choices for our customers, we should not be
a set of confusing and incoherent alternatives. There is no
hierarchy of justice – only the most appropriate justice in
each case.
So we need a better map of the ombudsman and the
wider administrative justice landscape, and agreement on
who does what best. And even history argues for a proper
review. As it happens, April 1, 2007 will see be the 40th
anniversary of the establishment of the Parliamentary
Ombudsman. Recent years have seen a series of piecemeal
and patchwork changes to the Ombudsmen arrangements
in the UK. It seems to me that the time has now come for
a more comprehensive, coherent and in depth review.
Just think what has happened since the Parliamentary
Ombudsman was created in 1967:
• entry into Europe – EU law;
• civil justice reforms/ADR;
• devolution;
• Human Rights Act;
• Data Protection and Freedom of Information Acts;
• a wholesale shift in the way that public services are
delivered – in partnerships between central and local
government providers, between public and private and
voluntary sectors, and against a backdrop of an ever
changing regulatory environment.
In the light of all that it would be astonishing if the
arrangements first put in place in 1967, and largely
unchanged since then, did provide a fit for purpose
Ombudsman for the 21st century.
CONCLUSION
So, in conclusion, I would say that we live in interesting
times in administrative justice. The constituent parts are
talking to each other much more than they used to, and
there is a real chance, with the Administrative Justice
Council, of making it a much more coherent and accessible
system. But the various components are not finding it easy
to work together, partly because the landscape still lacks
overall shape and boundaries are uncertain. The customer
finds it hard to navigate the system and gain redress.
A comprehensive review of public sector Ombudsmen
arrangements in the UK in the run up to the 40th
anniversary of the establishment of the Parliamentary
Ombudsman would be a good way to get back on track. It
would also be an excellent 40th birthday present for the
Ombudsman.
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